"And a woman is only a woman but a good cigar is a smoke" Kipling. "The Betrothed"
Author: Quine Atal
Writer, editor, cook, programmer. I've worn a few hats and had a few adventures. Currently writing philosophy and blogging.
Transplanted from the New York City to San Francisco back when that was in style. I tried many things, earning a Masters degree in philosophy (SFSU 1980), but learning to program ultimately determined my living. Marriage had its own effect on that direction.
I believe I have written something around 150+ book reviews for Amazon, but I have posted my last. Why? Over the years, Amazon has rejected three of my reviews for words they didn’t like.
The first two rejections were pretty illogical. In a book titled “On Bullshit” (the book title and link laid out by Amazon at the top of the review), I used the word ‘bullshit.’ In a book titled “Assholes, a Theory,” you can guess the rest. I didn’t make changes to satisfy Amazon’s absurd demands. I simply didn’t post those reviews—the very short Assholes review is here.
The third rejection went differently. In a book titled “Conspiracies of Conspiracies” (history and content of conspirational thinking), the author notes that from the mid-nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century, most political and economic conspiracy theories blamed (among many others) ‘Jews,’ or ‘Jewish bankers’ for the world’s troubles. It seemed to me it must be the words derived from ‘Jew’ that was Amazon’s problem.
This time, I tried an experiment. I re-submitted the review, substituting underscores ‘____’ for the words ‘Jews’ and ‘Jewish.’ The result was not merely another rejection but a warningletter telling me I had “violatedcommunityguidelines.” (Is there a guideline pertaining to underscores in reviews?), and I should consider the letter a “first warning.” Amazon would, they said, ban me from posting reviews should I continue my unsocial behavior.
That email was the last straw for me. The “first warning” will be my last. I will post no more reviews of non-fiction books on Amazon. I will make an exception for fiction writing by authors I know on social media, especially if they also review one of my books (novels or non-fiction). I will continue to read non-fiction purchased from Amazon (via bookbub.com), and if interesting enough, I will continue to review them here as I have done now with my conspiracies review.
Elon Musk recently changed (Nov 15, 2024) X’s (formerly Twitter) user agreement. From that point on, anything posted or displayed becomes the royalty-free but non-exclusive property of Musk to sell as he pleases, including for A.I. training purposes. This comes down to Musk not paying for your content—is he paying you now?—but also that you still own your content and may sell it to others if you wish. I noticed the summary I read did not distinguish between public and DM messages.
This policy change has naturally occasioned discussion on X, and I have said for a long time that I do not care if my content is used for A.I. training purposes. To be clear, I think people have legitimate concerns about the misuse of personal data. I may elaborate on this later, but for now, I’m only going to say that most of those “personal abuse” issues already occur; they do not need to buy what Elon is selling. In this hopefully short essay, I will only talk about A.I. training and response.
What does A.I. want with our content? A.I. is not trying to steal your work (images, text, music, what have you) to duplicate it. It is reading, viewing, or listening to your work to “understand” it (notice the scare quotes)! It wants to “know” how elements go together, what is a “proper” association or transition, what key concepts or color/line associations or musical phrases are present, and how they relate to those around them, including all the other music or images or text the A.I. “sees” in its training. That’s millions, even billions of texts, images, or bars of music. What constitutes “your work” in there is a miniscule portion of the total.
Human artists have done this with one another’s work since Homer! I do not know a writer who doesn’t read others and “draw” from what they read. The same is true for the visual or musical arts. When I write on a particular subject or craft a story, all that I have read is, in some part, melded into how I express myself—a combination of my own skills and what I have learned and remember from others. A.I. is doing exactly this when it outputs an answer. It associates around a topic using all that it has “learned.”
Of course, A.I. has total recall and we do not. Critics would say that A.I. can’t add anything strictly novel. That may be true, but I suspect much of what we think of as novel about our own creative thought or that of others has come from some long ago encountered thing whose source—in our minds—has been forgotten. The difference between us and the A.I. is that the A.I. doesn’t forget! The human melding of past experience and A.I. melding of training data are entirely different mechanisms, but the results are similar.
If some random human can read my tweets, essays, or novels and assimilate an idea that later finds its way into one of their works—remember, it isn’t a copy of my work—I would be honored by my inclusion. Why should it be any different if it is an A.I. that does the assimilating?
Suppose that phrase of yours, hardly noticed today, comes to be on everyone’s lips thanks to another artist’s—or A.I.’s—output fifty years from now? Either way, no one will know that you are the original creator of the phrase or technique, but either way, your creation is made to live again! That is why I invite Elon (in fact, I dare him, but that is another matter) to use my tweets to train A.I. As for Amazon or WordPress, they can use my books, reviews, and essays! I won’t get paid, but then I’m not being paid now and I’m still writing stuff!
My books and essays are copyrighted (A.I. cannot just “read them out” without getting into abuse territory already possible without A.I.), but copyright does not prevent other authors from incorporating my thoughts—even literally, as fragments of text in their work. Why should I object if some future A.I. output does the same? That kind of fragmentary inclusion is pretty much the worst thing that could happen!
***
Why do I say above, “I dare Musk”—or Bezos, or the owners of WordPress—to let A.I. train on my writing? Because if they do dare, their A.I.’s will end up with such original phrases as “consummate conscious cunnilingists” and “pluripotent poetic porn” in their repertoire! I say let them!
This is a book about a socio-economic bubble. Like economic bubbles, when they pop, political, financial, and social chaos can ensue. Unlike economic bubbles, which always seem to grow larger than common sense should allow but from which nations usually recover, this bubble often, though not always, results in the collapse of the country or civilization involved. I have briefly covered Turchin’s theory in my Amazon review (attached below).
There are ten “planetary boundaries” which, if crossed—and we have crossed six or seven—will certainly doom our present industrial civilization and possibly human life. Briefly, the ten are:
Ocean acidification — Even now impacting our food chain.
Ocean and freshwater deoxygenation — Occurring at an alarming rate planet-wide.
Atmospheric aerosol loading — particles (smoke from forest fires, anyone?) pumped into the atmosphere. Many sources.
Biochemical flows (nitrogen and phosphorus) — from farming and other sources. One cause of deoxygenation in bodies of water.
Stratospheric ozone depletion — we beat this one. Now it’s back.
Biosphere integrity – biodiversity loss – collapse of the food chain — already underway.
Fresh water resource stress and loss — Whole nations—India, for example—are running out of water.
Deforestation and other land-use problems contribute to the collapse of the biosphere.
Novel entities – Land and water pollution — heavy metals, plastics, non-biological wastes.
Climate change — the big kahuna! Impinges on all of the above.
What do these ten items have to do with Dr. Turchin’s socio-economic theory? Among other things, Dr. Turchin tells us that external factors like hostile nations, wars, and stresses like the ten listed above—all having economic implications—act to make collapse triggered by the socio-economic cycle he describes more likely.
According to Dr. Turchin, the United States came close to a collapse into populist autocracy following the Depression of 1929 thanks to the same dynamics—stagnant wages leading to the immiseration of the working class, a gigantic wealth gap, and the overproduction of elites. Franklin Roosevelt’s election and policies—taxing the rich and using the money to build real public assets—pulled us back from the brink. Ironically, World War II gave his policies an unexpected lift, and the good they did helped the nation coast through mostly good economic times for over thirty years following the war.
But things began to turn downwards again in the mid-1970s. Working-class wages stagnated, and taxes on the rich were reduced to the extent that overproduction of the elite class and an enormous wealth gap were inevitable. In Roosevelt’s time, the American Congress was not as fully captured by the monied elites as it is today, and perhaps even more significantly, planetary physical systems had not crossed any of the ten planetary boundaries listed above.
In the 1910s, there was, in fact, an interconnected, globalized world, albeit with a lower bandwidth than in our present. An Englishman in Bristol could pick up a telephone and order cigars from India with a reasonable expectation of delivery—though not in two days. World War I put an end to that early version of globalization. Since World War II, it has reassembled itself, this time at a far more frenetic and energy-intensive pace.
There was a crisis of asset prices in the 2007-10 financial meltdown that might have ended us. In the U.S., Obama’s policies ended it, but not like Roosevelt! Roosevelt took money from the rich and built tangible assets—dams, electric grids, highways, etc. Obama didn’t touch the rich, but re-inflated asset prices (mostly homes and the stock market) on internationally borrowed money. See “Ages of American Capitalism” by Johnathan Levy for more. Rather than correcting the excesses, Obama increased them by making room, in Turchin’s terms, for more elite overproduction.
The Trump presidency made matters worse by increasing U.S. debt to over one hundred percent of our gross national product for the first time. The COVID-19 pandemic, forcing the Biden administration to do more borrowing, was—and still is—another stress bearing on Truchin’s thesis. Today, the U.S. is embroiled in two wars (Ukraine and the Middle East), a quasi-war with China, and trying to deal with ever-ballooning bills for weather-related disaster relief. It is not unreasonable to imagine that the election of Donald Trump in 2024 could be the spark that brings to its end four hundred years of “Western civilization” since the Enlightenment. If I read Turchin and the world situation correctly (have I ever? We shall see), and as I’ve said for years now, this time civilization, such as it is, and sooner rather than later, doomed.
A well-written, high-level analysis of why societies—throughout history—cycle between growth and strength and then weakness and [potential] collapse. Often, the heights and depths to which these cyclic ends go are determined by factors like climate, geopolitical environment, institutional resilience, and the character of individual leaders. But the cycles themselves are the result of an impersonal and shifting movement of wealth within any given society, and this seems to be true of every culture the author could study going back to ancient Rome, China, Europe, and the U.S., from roughly 1600 to today is the focus.
Turchin calls his method Cliodynamics (‘clio’ ancient Greek for history). It involves the collection and cataloging of vast troves of historical data and systematic analysis of that collection using models tuned by taking the data of social growth and decay (for example, from 1500 through 1850) and then running the models through to the present to see how well they predict what we already know to have happened.
Three short appendices describe the process in non-mathematical terms. The bulk of the book, its first half, reviews the results of the cliodynamic investigation for our present time. The short of it is that we—the U.S. (Turchin’s main focus) and much of the world—are at a cliff’s edge, and the cliff is unstable and about to crumble, hence the book’s title.
There is the immiseration of the larger—laboring or unemployed—population. This means that wages are falling in real terms from decade to decade. Salaries do not cover the cost of living, often with two working adults in the household. At the other end of the economic pyramid are the economic elite, in today’s terms, the billionaires. Because they control so much of the total capital, they can dictate the economics of the laboring class. Government labor policy is heavily influenced, even outrightly purchased, by their money. To the extent that it controls coercive power, the government itself is a facet of the elite. In between the immiserated and the elite is an educated (in the technical sense) technocratic class and a group (call them the entrepreneurs), even better educated, who aspire to become elites.
Instability arises because there is room economically for only so many elites. Eventually, so much wealth concentrates in elite hands that the immiserated starve, depriving the elites of even low-cost labor. This isn’t good for anyone, so more frequently, some of the elite aspirants become counter-elites. They become the opposition, populists, and revolutionaries. They have the organizational and political skills to utilize starving labor as muscle in the business of overthrowing the system and establishing themselves as the new elite class.
Every culture and every time will vary in detail. How the revolution fares depends on the coordination of the masses, the unity of the elites in response to the challenge, and factors external to all. In the 1920s- 30s (U.S.), the then government was strong enough to force the elites to reduce their numbers (via taxes) and pay to alleviate the impoverishment of the laboring class. From the 1940s through the 1970s, wages grew in real terms. There were fewer of the truly impoverished. A large middle class arose.
So what happened? The middle class invested in the education of its children, resulting in an explosion of elite aspirants! At first, there was room at the top. There was money to be wrung out of the labor pool. Eventually, labor was immiserated again, and the elite ranks became overcrowded. New counter-elites arise, and the cycle begins again.
This is the oscillation Turchin describes. His version is more nuanced and sprinkled with historical examples that mark the various cyclic turnings. I hope I am not being unfair to Turchin. I’ve read and reviewed six or eight books on the theme of why nations fail, or why a particular nation failed, or the present day’s economic predicament, or the roots of Trumpist populism in America, and so on. End Times is consistent with all of them and gives the reader a bird’s eye view of a larger process rooted in economics and human psychology—humans are greedy. They want what is best for their families and class (though, to be sure, sometimes they do not understand what that comes out to in the short term). That leads to an inherently unstable competitive dynamic because the point at which the elite class becomes numerically saturated and the point at which that fact is recognized can be a generation apart.
As I noted above, the details and time frame vary considerably from place to place and age to age. Much depends on factors in both the internal and external environment of the society under study. Turchin gets into all of this, the what, how, and why of the process. An excellent read for anyone interested in the cycles of history and power politics.
My review of Sheild of Achilles is linked here. Garments of Court and Palace is an examination of the first of the transitions (from the feudal order of the European Middle Ages to the “Princely State”) that took place (in Europe) in the late 15th and early 16th centuries.
My purpose in this essay is to examine Bobbitt’s projection—in the epilogue to this book—of the next, presently occurring evolution in statehood from “Nation-State” to “Market State.”
Bobbitt tells us a State, of whatever kind, must draw legitimacy from the people living in it by serving “the common good” of the people living within it (or at least that those people perceive their good to be served). What “common good” means, what percentage of the State’s citizens must believe they are being so served, and in what way (something that surely varies with the times and the politics of any particular State), Bobbitt does not say.
In the last chapters of his Achilles book, Bobbitt sketches three broad types or variations on the market state theme, using the U.S., China, and Western Europe as examples. In Garments, his purpose is merely to remind us that the market state is the next chapter in the present evolution of political organizations. But he does say a few things about it.
He tells us that as the present nation-state secured its legitimacy by providing services (electricity, water, education, security, medical care in much of the world”) and thus fostering “the common good,” the market state will legitimize itself by providing opportunity and choice. Opportunity means the market state does not care if you are black, white, gay, straight, or anywhere in between. So long as you have the education, skill, and desire to serve in a presently required—worth remuneration—role, you will have a job.
He makes two problematic observations:
In a market state, the “wealth gap” will naturally widen as some are better able to take advantage of available opportunities.
The media (and he means all types: TV, newspapers, social media) will assume the role of watchdog over the doings of the market and its players.
Some wealth gap will exist in any economy that the government does not strictly control, in which case the executive splits such wealth as may exist. However, recent history has taught us that the extreme gap manifesting in the U.S. and Western Europe is corrosive to social cohesion. Nothing about our present situation supports the “common good” unless that is perversely defined as the top one or two percent of the wealthiest people in the nation. In End Times: Elites, Counter-Elites, and the Path of Political Disintegration (Peter Turchin, 2023), the author cites historical data going back thousands of years, points to an excessive wealth gap as one of the main progenitors of socio-political turmoil and usually,, collapse. I will undoubtedly review that book when I’ve completed it.
If capitalists really wanted, for example, to improve their own productivity twenty years on, they would, among other things, generously fund education. But twenty years (most corporations do not survive even that long) is far too long a horizon for corporations competing in the market for investors who want, naturally enough, to maximize their gains today, or at most in a very few years.
If capitalists paid all of their employees a living wage, invested in education, and at least slowed the adoption of labor-replacing technology, giving people time to adapt, that would foster the common good. However, with rare and minor exceptions, corporations have not taken this course—unless forced by the government or unions—in the history of capitalist markets.
More is to be said about this, but I do not want to belabor the point. The short and sweet of it is that I cannot find any plausible interpretation of “the common good” that could, in the long term, be satisfied by the present market paradigm.
Even if a market state would not be particularly good for most people, Bobbitt can well be correct in that we (the world’s advanced industrial nations) are transitioning into versions of it. His analysis was prefigured by the movie Rollerball in 1975—even the greatest of philosophers “stand on the shoulders of giants.” (Isaac Newton 1675)! Bobbitt does, however, make a correlated prediction that appears to have been falsified. He tells us that “the media” (social media included) will operate as a check on the market’s participants—corporate and individual.
In this 2012 book, he was aware that local newspapers were disappearing all over the U.S. Twelve years later, this trend has accelerated. Why? Because all these little news outlets are owned by three of four gigantic corporations (who also own local and national TV and big-market papers), the little papers, in particular, are not profitable. Since profit is the ultimate aim of the market, they’ve got to go. It is possible, in 2012, that Bobbitt thought evolving social media would compensate for this local news extinction, but it does not. In 2012, the public was, by and large, unaware of social media’s capacity for convincing and indiscriminate disinformation and propaganda, something that came—to Americans anyway—as rather a shock in 2016-17 and has become far worse since then.
Far from being checks on corporate shenanigans, the media are quickly being transformed into shills! From the viewpoint of markets, this makes perfect sense. There is more profit to be made if everyone speaks highly of you. This across-the-board trend in media is another piece of evidence that “the common good” is not an objective at which the market aims.
Lastly, I want to say something about China and the intrinsically international nature of market states. In Shield of Achilles (2002), Bobbitt cites China as an example of one sort of evolving market state. In 2012, when he wrote Garments, it was possible to believe that China would continue on this trajectory. In 2024, it is moving back toward a centrally planned economy. Bobbitt is smart enough to know that geopolitical evolution is not a straight line, and some backsliding cannot be uncommon. But he does not tell us how long before a temporary reversal becomes a different direction altogether, nor what happens, globally, when a major pole of the evolving system reverses course.
If a belligerent nation reverses course for the sake of military adventurism—as China appears to be doing for the sake of Taiwan and the South China Sea—can the other major, still evolving, nation states just permit that evolution to continue naturally? Are market states as efficient as nation states in providing for their defense—of crucial importance and Machievelli’s primary concern? Can a substantial military that always costs more (in its totality) than any individual corporate profits made by equipping it, be supported in a fully formed market state? I’ll leave such questions for my readers.
In 2002, Philip Bobbitt published The Sheild of Achilles, in which he traces the European evolution—from the feudal order of the fourteenth century—of the modern “nation-state” through prior phases, roughly every one hundred to two hundred years. Garments is a book about the times of the first of these changes, the appearance of the “princely state,” and in particular one man’s perception and foreshadowing of it.
Besides explaining Machiavelli’s “The Prince” (which Bobbitt tells us was the name given by the publisher after Machiavelli’s death. Machiavelli called it “The Principalities,” an important distinction that helps Bobbitt to make his points), the author makes the perfectly reasonable argument that, taken in historical context and with regard to another of Machiavelli’s major works (The Discourses), Machiavelli was not the renaissance Rasputin, but rather a highly insightful and articulate geopolitical analyst and theorist of his day.
Far from being the person who advised tyrants to be as tyrannical as possible for the sake of maintaining their personal power, Machiavelli attempted to direct princes (and often he spoke of republics, his example early Rome) in what might be necessary to preserve his state acting, it is hoped, for the good of the people who are its residents—at least its citizens. Today, Machiavelli would not only be the world’s consummate political philosopher and exponent of “realpolitik,” he would be considerably more moral—in Christian terms—than some of the infamous practitioners of realpolitik in the past seventy-five years. Making this case, in addition to painting a picture of Machiavelli’s political times, is the overall purpose of Bobbitt’s book.
Bobbitt uses an epilogue to remind us that the nation-state is not the end of the matter and that we are now moving into the market-state. I think Dr. Bobbitt is too sanguine about this development, even if he is right that it is occurring. Perhaps he is trying hard to remain neutral. A market state in the modern Capitalist paradigm cannot, almost by definition, be legitimated in the way Bobbitt claims it must be. There have been a few reversals since he wrote this book in 2012. I will take this matter up on my blog.
The reader should note that only 52% of the pages listed are Bobbitt’s text. The rest are references, acknowledgments, and so on. It was a good read. I enjoyed it!
I like Bernie Sanders. I have a lot of sympathy for him, and I agree with most of what he says in this book. However, I have a few quibbles I’m going to discuss here.
Mr. Sanders addresses seven primary areas:
Collapsing Health Care
Collapsing Education
The Crumbling Media
The Obscene Wealth Gap
Monied capture of the Democratic Party
Climate Change and the Petroleum Industry
Labor – Unions, Corporate Representation, and the work-day
I have nothing to say in this essay about the first five. Sanders makes a superb case for every one of them. I’m going to talk about the last two, and concerning labor, only his work-day proposal because, unfortunately, like petroleum, it is linked to climate change.
THE CLIMATE CHANGE PROBLEM
Climate change is the existential crisis of our time. It is a crisis we can no longer block or even substantially mitigate for much longer. Our present global industrial and economic system is doomed. It does not mean the extinction of humanity. It does mean the end of our present way of life (see my review of The Uninhabitable Earth by David Wallace-Wells with many other links).
The petroleum industry is not solely responsible for the problem as Sanders implies. They did not force us, from the earliest decades of the 20th Century, to rest our entire economy on oil. Before there was an oil economy there was coal, the basis of early industrialization for both Europe and America. Coal is even dirtier than oil, but the Earth had far fewer people in those days, and few developing industrial nations. As early as 1850 scientists warned that carbon dioxide would begin to warm the planet when annual production of the gas exceeded the Earth’s capacity to absorb it. At the time, no one knew when that would be, or how the warming would manifest itself in weather patterns. Some suggested a new ice age. Wait a thousand years. That may still happen.
By the 1970s, there was enough data to see that the warming process had already begun. The petroleum industry didn’t have to lie about it—although they did lie. No one listened to the science, which, by then, was long available to the public. The petroleum industry did not force consumers to buy more cars, and then bigger cars. They did not force the American government to build out a national highway system (instead of improving the railroads) or deregulate the airlines resulting—over the ensuing decades—in a hundredfold increase in flight miles per year. Consumer choice, abetted by government policy did all that. Lastly, the petroleum industry did not force other large nations—China and India in particular—to choose to industrialize like the U.S. and Europe spending the latter half of the 20th Century “catching up,” which, in their case, meant burning a lot of coal.
The petroleum companies never had to lie. Even had they told us one hundred years ago that increased use of fossil fuels would eventually upset the global climate balance, people, and in particular governments (think military competition and technology), would have felt compelled to use fossil fuels to feed growing populations, expand their economies, defend their territories, or engage in naked belligerence. One hundred years ago a fully formed sovereign world government might have acted effectively to prevent what is happening to the climate now. There was no world government then and there isn’t one now. The competition goes on. It is impossible to stop—until we are all dead.
Curtailing the use of fossil fuels sufficiently to bend the temperature curve down even one hundred years from now—it is too late to do anything about the next hundred or more years—we would have to cut their use by ninety percent immediately. No more vacation flying or driving, no more plastic, no more automobile or boat racing, no gas-powered lawnmowers—no recreational or entertainment-related use of fossil fuels whatsoever! Batteries will not save us. A Tesla must be driven fifty-thousand miles before the carbon cost of its manufacture (including the batteries) drops below that of a gas-powered car and that doesn’t count the carbon cost of battery recycling. We do not even ban professional automobile racing, a sport built around burning petroleum! That’s insane!
The only fuel that could have saved us is hydrogen from seawater produced by renewable energy (whose manufacture has its own enormous carbon cost). Had the world begun that conversion seventy-five years ago—a conversion requiring a lot of carbon to build out—we might be there now. It is far too late.
Of course, my recommendation above is both economically and politically impossible—globally! Every modern economy in the world would collapse immediately. A billion people would be thrown out of work and many would starve. Every politician in power, or who hopes, someday, to be in power, lies about climate change. The lie is that we can still do much about it. We cannot.
THE THREE OR FOUR DAY WORK WEEK
Climate change is not specifically an issue of the political left. Labor policy very much is such an issue and Sanders tells us the forty-hour work week (established roughly a hundred years ago) has outlived its utility. Believe me, I get it. I’m retired now but I worked for “the man” for forty years always, officially anyway, a forty-hour week. Would I have supported a shorter week for the same pay? You shouldn’t have to ask. Bernie’s suggestion ensures full (or fuller) employment, and that would be a good thing.
The problem (I said above this issue is connected to climate change) is what the bulk of the working population would do with their extra leisure time. If people used the time to advance their education, to read—or write—more books, if they used their leisure to do philosophy, to produce art, to help aged neighbors, foster local athletics, exercise, play with their children in their own backyards, or help to grow food in local gardens, the three or four-day workweek would be a social and cultural blessing. But that is not what most people would do. They would use that time to travel, to drive and fly, to water ski, pilot ATVs across the eroding Earth, jet ski over increasingly polluted waters, or to go (travel) to more concerts and professional sporting events—automobile racing anyone? In short, they would consume more fuel belching even more carbon into the atmosphere, and that is all I’m going to say on the subject.
A “cry of the heart” from a principled politician is refreshing. I have no objection to some people being more prosperous than others, and neither does Mr. Sanders. But the wealth disparity in the U.S. is genuinely obscene and more so in that the wealthiest among us do not contribute proportionally to maintain everything needed to keep their capital flows going. Every branch of the U.S. government is now captured by monied interests, the legislature most of all, and this is true at both national and State levels. Sanders repeatedly touches on this issue, and rightly so. It is the core of our problem.
In some detail, Sanders covers health care, education, child care, the media (all types), and our political process. His overarching issue is the class conflict between labor and capital; between the owners of concentrated capital, and the population who labor to produce the goods and services that generate the wealth. He is right. Sanders is no Marxist. He is not opposed to class distinctions. He wants to make the distinctions more balanced and he is right to do so because the present disparity is causing tens of millions to suffer in one way or another.
Sanders paints with a broad brush—necessary to keep the book of moderate length and easily read. He succeeds on both counts, but there is a price to be paid. Many of his arguments are oversimplified. The petroleum industry—even despite its decades of obfuscation on the subject—is not solely responsible for climate change. A great deal of that accountability belongs to consumers, most of whom are of the laboring class.
Sanders writes a lot about the disarray of the present Democratic party and how it has come about. He is right about much of it. Citizens United in 2009 did not help, forcing Democrats into the same fund-raising frenzy from the rich as the Republicans. But one thing he doesn’t mention is the present cultural obsession with identity politics, a phenomenon whose emergence has been solely an effort of the political left beginning in the 1970s. As much as anything else, besides money, this has distracted the Democratic Party from the wider issue of class. No matter to what race you belong, or LGBTQ+ letter you choose for yourself, you are still, most likely, among the laboring class. That most fundamental, political divide is now diffused by the demands of alternate identities.
I am being perhaps unfair to Sanders. His goal is not an exhaustive analysis of factors responsible for America’s social, cultural, and political unraveling. He wants us to aspire to a better American society for all, even capitalists who will face less resentment should Sanders’ vision for balancing the scales ever come about. It might never be possible, but it is a good and hopeful vision.
This is one of those books about which too much additional comment is warranted. In the main, I have said what needs be said in the review itself (see below). Gee can be correct about the mechanism of evolution and the inability of the physical evidence (fossils and DNA) to tell us a complete story about who came from what, and be incorrect as to its ultimate directedness towards capacity for abstraction laying the groundwork for moral free will, religion, and art.
Most of these arenas pertain to Gee’s discussion of consciousness, in particular “self awareness,” which he claims may be exhibited by crows and other animals. He recognizes that what looks like human-like self awareness in crows might emerge from some other mechanism (of consciousness) altogether and be unlike what humans experience. Nevertheless, he unhesitatingly declares that there is no qualitative difference between human consciousness and some of the higher animals. I beg to differ.
Gee claims that most people spend little to no time being “aware of their consciousness.” While it may be true that few besides philosophers spend hours a day in Husserlian epoche, the point is not that humans rarely think about their awareness, but that every human can exercise that capacity when he or she wishes. Moreover it lies always close at hand. All I need to do to evoke the capacity in you is to ask “are you awake?”
Self-consciousness, what I have elsewhere called recursive-consciousness, is the foundation of our ability to have abstract thoughts, thoughts about things unrelated to our sensory inputs or our need for food, sex, or avoidance of danger. It enriches our language by introducing the need to invent language that communicates the effect. From this stems religion and art.
What signifies the emergence of art and religion in a species? Broadly, behavior that has nothing to do with acquiring food, sex, or safety, warmth, and so on. Cave paintings and decorative items (shell necklaces anyone) will do for art, while ritualized burial serves for religion.
Are there animals who spend time and energy creating art or self-decoration. Are there animals who ritually bury their dead? I know of none. Both sorts of activities require resources and energy that would be better put to hunting or reproduction. Why ritually bury your dead? Something about this implies belief in some after life, and possibly also fear of ghosts, which may be the earliest outgrowth of the nascent religious impulse.
Primitive humans spent considerable resource propitiating ghosts later leading to venerating ancestors. The earliest human specialization might be the shaman, a profession dedicated to serving other than material needs. I know of no case of this among the animals. Gee would say (I believe) that we cannot know where exactly in the evolution of sapiens these qualities appeared. He is right, but again it doesn’t matter. At whatever point it appeared, that appearance marks “the human.” Could it be that art and religion appeared in hominid branches other than the sapiens line and petered out? Yes, it could. But that does not mean that these particular qualities are not qualitatively different from every other animal type that doesn’t exhibit them. It happens that our line, whatever sequence led to sapiens, is the only one left standing and in the absence of evidence (art, ritual burial, abstract language) the only one we know of that has achieved these milestones.
But even granting that art, religion, and the evolution of language to express them are evidence of a qualitative difference between human mind and the animals, why should this difference suggest the teleological in evolution? Because neither art nor religion contribute to the acquizition of food, clothing, and shelter. They do contribute to socialization which has adaptive advantages, but evolution has solved this problem, even among predators (e.g., wolves) long before the appearance of art and religion.
If it happens that there is a God, a teleologically infused evolution leading, eventually, to his recognition, would not be surprising. This is not to say that the appearance of art, religion, and the languaged to communicate about them entail a God, but a God is, at least, consistent with their appearance.
This is a book that does well in some parts and not so well in others. Broadly, it is a book about evolution, the evolution of modern humans, and the biological, social, and psychological parallels between modern humans and the higher animals.
The first part is the good part. Given the present scientific paradigm, no teleological (purposeful and established [ordained] before the fact) endpoint to evolution exists. Evolution is what it is: random genetic changes that happen to be of or take some advantage of some changing environmental condition. Gee argues convincingly that the appearance of humans as we know them on Earth now might have come out differently, arisen from different earlier stocks, or perhaps not come to exist on the planet at all. He also notes that the paleontological record is too sparse for us to reliably assemble the story of even our present form from the last handful of millions of years. This includes the marvelous addition of genetic analysis to the paleontological tool kit. Marvelous as genetics is, back past a few hundred thousand years, its samples are even rarer than fossils.
In roughly the second part of the book, Gee compares modern humans to animals to show that none of our supposedly unique qualities (gait, brain size, tools, language–he barely mentions writing–and self-consciousness) are entirely unique to humans. Here, I think he tries to be too clever by half, suggesting the slime trails of voles, or the smell of urine to a dog, are communication with some comparable quality to human communication, which also happens to include such passive forms of signaling if more subtle than slime or urine. Some animals even possess rudimentary language communicated through gestures (bees) and often sound, as do we.
Agreeing with Gee that the evolution of humans as we find them was not foreordained, we need not agree with him that nothing different-in-kind has emerged from the process. But since this difference manifests in art and religion, we cannot be entirely sure, as Gee unhesitatingly declares himself to be, that the endpoint (a being who could express himself in art, religion, philosophy, etc.) was not, by some unspecified ordination, teleologically driven even if it needn’t have emerged through exactly the path it happened to take. Gee’s very good first part and not-so-well-argued last part must leave that question entirely up in the air.
Gee is right that many animals possess nascent capabilities that resemble some of what humans do, though none I know of developed any form of writing. But he goes too far when he asserts that there are no qualitative differences between the abstractions of nuclear physics or moral philosophy and the chattering of birds and barking dogs. We cannot know, he tells us, what gospels the crows are telling one another. With regard to the last quality he covers, self-consciousness, which he admits is ultimately the source of religion and art (abstractions and their reflection in language in general), he is, in the end, an eliminative materialist on mind, a position that only writes off and does not explain such things as art, religion, and abstractions generally.
In my formal review (included below) I said this book has problems. Byron Belitsos is a long-time friend and I did not wish to give him too difficult a time on Amazon, but there are more problems with his book than I noted in the review. It’s time I reviewed those other issues. I hope he will take these in the philosophical spirit with which they are offered.
First up is a technical quibble. Byron seems disposed to believe in demons to a greater degree than The Urantia Book (a source in Byron’s book, see below) suggests is real or sensible, at least in my reading. On page 279, with reference to Pentecost and The Urantia Book, Byron states: “The unseen followers of Caligastia … now had a choice. … Those who accepted their judgment and agreed to rehabilitation were removed. …; others who did not accept were to remain here …” (that is, on Earth).
Byron is misinterpreting. His error makes a difference to the spirit of his book where “the demonic” is concerned. What The Urantia Book actually says is: “The entire group of rebel midwayers is at present held prisoner. No more do they roam this world … the pouring out of the Spirit of Truth upon all flesh forever made it impossible for disloyal spirits of any sort or description ever again to invade even the most feeble of human minds. Since the day of Pentecost there never again can be such a thing as demonical possession” [77:7.8 emphasis mine].
Byron has an escape! “Caligastia, your apostate Planetary Prince, is still free on Urantia to prosecute his nefarious designs, but he has absolutely no power to enter the minds of men, nor can he draw near to their souls to tempt or corrupt them unless they really desire to be cursed by his wicket presence.” [53:8.6 emphasis mine]
What constitutes “real desire” here? The Urantia Book is not explicit. Does it demand a knowledge of Caligastia specifically, or is a sincere desire to be “possessed by the devil” sufficient? There is a continuum between these two points, and the matter of what constitutes sincerity and its relation to what is known by the individual concerned must also be examined. But my point here is that Byron has some wiggle room to insert a genuine demonic, though in my opinion, very little. Possession as such is out. What powers does Caligastia have to communicate with anyone? The Urantia Book does not say.
My next issue is about something Byron does not say much about. Theodicy has two great domains. The domain of evil originating in human doings, and a domain theologians call “natural evil,” having no or only indirect human entanglement. Earthquakes are the quintessential example of natural evils, but floods, natural fire, disease, and many other things that can kill us also qualify. Why does God allow innocent people to be killed by these things? If a building collapses in an earthquake because it was corruptly built with inferior materials, then human-entangled evil enters the picture, but earthquakes, floods, etc, have killed innocents for many centuries before humans understood, even theoretically, how to protect themselves from these things.
Early in his book, Byron explicitly says he is not going to deal with “natural evil.” That’s fine, author’s privilege. But I do not see how one can write a book on theodicy and ignore natural evil. It, and not human-sponsored evil, is the foundation of the theodicy problem. Even in the earliest days of monotheistic theology, that humans did evil and that this evil is associated with free will and, therefore not directly, personally, God’s doing was understood. But what today is understood as a natural physical process was another matter entirely. The blame for an earthquake killing my family could be laid directly at God’s feet. Ironically, The Urantia Book has the finest answer to the matter of natural evil I have seen in any source. God cannot do the impossible. He cannot make a square circle, and he cannot make a universe grounded in universal physical law that evolves everything from stars to humans without the process sometimes harming humans (not to mention dinosaurs). I cover this in more detail in my essay Theodicy in The Urantia Book.
My third issue has to do with Byron’s use of Ken Wilber’s classification scheme to organize his “integral theodicy.” Wilber’s scheme here is not the issue but Byron’s use of it. Byron notices that not all the various theodicies he covers fit neatly into Wilber’s schema. More seriously, though, I wonder what Byron gets out of his process. I did not find anything in his “integration” that improved upon ideas already discussed in the book. Yes, one idea fits into category B, and another fits category C, but what of it? The integration did not, in other words, advance or enhance any understanding of the individual theories as he covered them prior to this ending. If anything, Byron’s process in this section is a categorical differentiation which is valuable as far as it goes, but it doesn’t “integrate” anything.
My fourth issue is more abstract. Byron began this book with a Master’s Thesis. The first part of the book, enhanced, is the thesis. Among the purposes of this book (personal communication with the author) is to introduce The Urantia Book to the scholarly (academic) theological community. I happen to think there is a lot that is nonsensical (cosmology, biology, human origins) in The Urantia Book (see my Problems with the Cosmology and Astronomy of The Urantia Book for details on the cosmological issues). However, The Urantia Book’s theology (and so the theodicy) eclipses everything humans have written on the subject for twenty-five hundred years! It isn’t that human speculations are all wrong, but they are woefully incomplete. Their truths are melded and greatly expanded in The Urantia Book, enhancing them in relation to one another.
Human speculations are often cast as either-or choices: either “free will” or “greater goods” for example. But The Urantia Book argues convincingly that the truth is more usually both-and. Not only are all the [partly correct but incomplete] human theories amalgamated, but much more is also given. The Urantia Book’s depiction of the universe’s administrative structure adds a thick layer to the resolution to the theodicy problem (on both “natural” and human-gendered sides) that no theologian has ever suggested (see my above-referenced theodicy essay)! The Urantia Book is the integration that Byron seeks! But for that very reason, his project must fail–at least for now. Western academic theology is chained wrist and ankle to the Old and New Testament, such source documents as exist, and centuries-old Apocrypha. No academic theologian today could publically embrace The Urantia Book without committing professional suicide!
The book is a scholarly examination of a subject called Theodicy. Theodicy attempts to answer questions like “Why does an omnipotent and good God permit evil?” Such questions arose with the appearance of Judeo-Christianity because this evolving thought was the first to arrive at the idea that there is one God who must be infinite, unified, and good.
Mr. Belitsos reviews the history of the discipline from pre-Christian thinkers through Augustine in the Fifth Century and on to modern times. He also covers the broad difference in approach to the subject between the Western (Roman) and Eastern (Orthodox) Christian traditions. He brings us up to modern times via Kant and Hegel and into the twentieth century. I am oversimplifying. There are many others he includes in his explorations.
Next, the author brings up The Urantia Book. While not considered a scholarly or authoritative text by academicians, the book does contain an approach to the theodicy question that adds significant psychological, social, and historical insights. I have read this text, and Mr. Belitsos misinterprets it in various respects, but that is only my opinion. The Urantia Book is complex and nuanced enough to stand up to differing interpretations. I will deal with these matters in my blog.
After introducing The Urantia Book and pulling together its theodicy, Mr. Belitsos combines it and traditional thought on the subject into what he calls “an Integral theodicy” based on a four-way partitioning of experience–subjective-objective, individual-social–by Ken Wilber, whom the author calls “an integral philosopher.” I’m not a big fan of Mr. Wilber’s work, but that is not to say his thinking might not be helpful in this regard. Mr. Belitsos believes this is the case.
From that point, adding back the insights of the Eastern Orthodox Church–of which he is a fan–the author attempts to summarize everything into a satisfying answer to the theodicy question. He fails, and to be fair, he knows he fails, pointing this out in the book’s last pages. Formulating an intellectually satisfying theodicy is possible–the author’s efforts are exemplary. But intellectual achievement is far from emotional repose. There is, the author realizes, no emotionally satisfying answer to the theodicy question in the face of our daily exposure to evil throughout our present world, not to mention the horrors of our history.
Mr. Belitsos’ scholarship is here and there uneven despite over three hundred detailed end-notes. At one point, the author connects the thought of a contemporary theologian with conspiracy theories that don’t belong in this book. Elsewhere he introduces a bit of “Urantia movement lore,” also misplaced in a scholarly work, even one that accepts The Urantia Book as a source! But these diversions are few and short. Truths about Evil, Sin, and the Demonic is a good summary of the subject and a commendable effort to find at least an intellectually satisfying answer to theodicy’s puzzle.
Book one (Foreign Agent) and book two (Foreign Agent the Last Chapter) are closely related. The final setting in the first book (Bangkok), and its characters, carry through the entirety of the second book. The “Cult of Aten” is introduced in the second book where its infrastructure begins to be built, but the novel ends before it is finished and launched.
Book three takes us back to the U.S. where its author, having published the second novel, receives a thumb drive from Bangkok containing the code for an elaborate website along with an image. As with the other novels, Cult of Aten is written in memoir style, this time explicitly as a diary begun in 2028 while Matthew lies in a hospital bed recovering from an assassination attempt–no spoilers here, this fact is noted in the first chapter. The bulk of the novel (everything through Chapter 19 of 22) is Matthew catching the reader up to all that happens from the autumn of 2023 when he launches the Cult of Aten, to his present–in the hospital–in 2028.
Except for five chapters in its middle covering a single [important] week spent in Mexico the pacing of this novel is much faster than the first two. This is necessary because the third novel spans five years compared to two years for the first and only one for the second. It is also consistent with Matthew’s claim (in 2028) that this catching-up was drafted in two weeks from his hospital bed. It is a result of this “catching-up” and explanation that Cult of Aten can be read as a stand-alone novel. Yes, the story is enriched by the first two novels–especially the second–but they aren’t strictly necessary. The reader is not lost without them.
What would a novel from Matthew be without sex? It’s here in plenty, but there is a change, Matthew says a “literary advance” on his part. While still explicit, the sex (with one exception “because it was unusual compared to the rest”) is softened around the edges. The exceptional detail Matthew is otherwise known for is absent, most of the time. Interestingly, this is also consistent with the story’s pacing.
So how does a text written in 2028 come to get published in 2023? Two words: time travel! You’ll just have to read the story!
All in all, in my opinion, this is the best of the three books. I asked Matthew what gave him this idea. What he said was: “The first novel’s insight was ‘what if the Chinese offered to pay me for my opinion.’ The second novel’s was ‘what if there was more than one alien spaceship and the other didn’t crash?’ This novel, the third was ‘what would happen if the Cult of Aten (first invented in novel number two) and the books really took off and became a global phenomenon?’”
About 1500 BCE Ankhnaton, Pharaoh of Egypt, tried to establish monotheism in place of the Egyptian pantheon. He tried to use the Sun God Ra to be the symbol of his monotheism. Ra’s manifestation on Earth, in the divinity of the Pharaoh, was called Aten. Ankhnaton did this in an effort to break to stranglehold of the priestly class on Egyptian society. He failed. The priestly class outlived him…
But this CULT OF ATEN is not about THAT Aten!
This CULT OF ATEN idea first appeared in the novel Foreign Agent the Last Chapter and given full flower in the third novel of the series Cult of Aten. Membership in the Cult of Aten requires of you only:
2. Write and post meaningful reviews of both novels to Amazon and/or Goodreads.
3. Post links to your reviews as comments to this page!
That’s all there is to becoming a member. It helps if you are a human being, but your nationality, race, gender, and sexuality have no bearing. All are welcome.
The reviews need not be good reviews! If you don’t like the books, you say so. The only requirement–what I mean by meaningful above–is that you say something that shows me you read the books–however superficially.
What are the benefits of becoming a member of the CULT OF ATEN?
1. You receive the eternal gratitude of Matthew Rapaport, publisher and ostensible author of the novels Foreign Agent, Foreign Agent the Last Chapter, and Cult of Aten!
2. You signal to all other members of the Cult of Aten that you know what you are doing in bed!
There aren’t any philosophical danglers in this book (that I can see) to discuss, but there is the matter of Israeli apartheid. Several stories Bamford ties together begin with Israel and apartheid South Africa in the 1970s, particularly the man Arnon Milchan, an Israeli agent who became (and still is) a billionaire Hollywood film producer. His story threads its way through half the book.
In the 1970s and 80s, the Israelis and South Africa were allies. In particular, the Israelis were actively helping South Africa maintain and strengthen apartheid. Arnon Milchan (before he was a Hollywood producer) was Israel’s primary asset on the ground in South Africa. But why? It was one thing for Israel to want friends; it had few enough. But why would a State composed of formerly oppressed people actively work to promote racial oppression? Jews are, as far as I can tell from America, no more biased against Black people than anyone else. But Jews in Israel, not all the people, but the government, are biased against Palestinian Arabs and have been since before 1948! When Israel became a State, there were far more Palestinians living in the territory than Jews. Supposedly emerging from the European democratic tradition, Israel immediately created a two-track hierarchy. Jews were citizens who had a vote. Palestinians living in Israeli territory were second-class citizens who did not.
Zionists (the term for militant Jews still in use today) planned an apartheid state from the beginning. There were more Arabs in Palestine than Jews, and no matter how many Jews flocked to the new Israel, the Arab population would always be able to out-reproduce them. There would never be a Jewish government in Palestine if Arabs had an equal vote. Today, the situation has become even more fraught. As Bamford points out, Israeli apartheid is worse than what black populations suffered in the southern tip of Africa! South Africa, after all, is a big country. There were places for the oppressed population to live. The same is not the case in Israel. Even the territory the Palestinians occupied until the 1967 and 1973 wars is now 85% Israeli! Further, the political climate in Israel has shifted far to the right because extreme right-wing Jews (mostly religious fundamentalists whose theologic egotism blocks any compromise, and not coincidentally are the occupants of all the Israeli settlements in what was Arab land on the West Bank) have, for decades, been out reproducing the much more liberal secular population.
Still, why support South Africa? A reading of Bamford’s book explains much. Israeli apartheid was overt from the beginning, but South Africa’s oppression of the black population went back to before the turn of the 20th century and was much more in the focus of the world’s attention than Israel’s. The longer South Africa could maintain apartheid, the longer Israel could avoid the world’s scrutiny. Zionists had an excuse. South Africa was not the world’s only white-dominated nation, but Israel is the world’s only “Jewish State.” When apartheid ended in South Africa (early 1990s), Israel was already decades into its American influence operations, with Milchan orchestrating much of it and American presidents of both parties looking the other way for the sake of the Jewish vote and the largess of big donors.
This is, to put it bluntly, a fantastic read. Mr. Bamford is a professional journalist with almost forty years of investigative credentials in the counterespionage world behind him, beginning with the Puzzle Palace in the 1980s. Overall, the story is about the failure of America’s counterintelligence agencies (mostly the FBI, but also the NSA) to catch any spies until long after they have spied, sometimes for decades. But incompetence (and sometimes just bad luck) is one thing. In the book’s last tale, the FBI and Justice Department become positively demonic, persecuting a wholly innocent woman–whom they had themselves determined was innocent–because there was, at the time, a hysteria over Russian election meddling (Russiagate) and the FBI needed a Russian to parade before the media.
Bamford begins with a couple of hacking stories. One can complain about the shoddy state of security in Military computers and those of the NSA, CIA, and FBI. Still, in the end, it is impossible to prevent all penetration of even [supposedly] secure systems, whether by actors outside the U.S. or employees within it. The most laughable case cited was one of the most serious, the theft of the most sensitive spy tools: software developed by the NSA and stolen by a hacker calling her/himself “Shadow Brokers.” As I said, it is hard to stop a hack until after it happens, but the shameful thing about this case is that Shadow Brokers, who claimed to be working INSIDE the American government, has to this day not been identified! By way of illustration, Bamford next relates the story of the North Korean hack of Sony Pictures as revenge for the Seth Rogan movie “The Interview.” That attack, and a number of others around the world by Russia, perpetrated with the tools stolen by Shadow Brokers!
The next and longest section in the book is about the Israelis, who have spied on and run influence operations in the U.S. for fifty years! In the 1970s and early 80s, it was about stealing nuclear secrets, not only secrets but physical uranium and nuclear bomb triggers. Since then, it has been about managing perceptions of Israel (declared an apartheid state by every human rights organization in the world, including those inside Israel) inside the U.S. Besides the Russians, no State wanted Trump elected president more than Israel; the Russians because Trump would weaken NATO and the European alliance, Israel because Trump would move the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem and look the other way as Israel continues to squeeze the Palestinians! Russian disinformation has been all over the news, but not a whisper about Israel!
But this particular story, as Bamford details it, is not exactly a failure in U.S. counterintelligence. According to the author, the FBI has known all about what the Israelis have been doing in the U.S. since the beginning (the 1970s at least) and has dutifully reported it up the chain to the Justice Department under every president (Democrat and Republican) from Carter to Biden! But every administration, afraid to lose Jewish campaign money, has ignored the reports! The names of the head people involved on both the Israeli and American sides–Israel’s fifth column in the U.S.–are given, and their portfolios are detailed! Readers will be shocked at the revelations, even more so if they are familiar with the Hollywood scene. Israel is after much more than merely electing pro-Israel candidates. Bamford lays out a vast Israeli operation since the mid-2000s to suppress the “Boycott, Divest, and Sanction” movement that seeks to have Israel abandon its apartheid anti-Palestinian policies by applying the same sort of pressure the world applied to South Africa. I will address some of this further in my blog.
Beyond the Israel story, Bamford delves into more traditional sorts of spies, all of which the FBI failed to catch until after much damage had been done. Sometimes not even then. In one case, a beautiful Chinese double agent (ultimately working for China) was sleeping with her two FBI handlers (see the book Tiger Trap: America’s Secret Spy War with China by David Wise for more details on that story)!
Bamford’s last story is that of the brutal treatment of a young graduate student, Maria Butina, who had the misfortune of being Russian, interested in geopolitics, and had started a small organization in Russia hoping to promote gun ownership. The FBI had investigated the girl a year earlier and concluded that she had no connection whatsoever with the Russian government. But when the Russiagate hysteria broke out in 2017, and then just after the release of the movie “Red Sparrow”, the Justice Department decided they had to go after someone to divert media attention from their own bungling of the matter. Ms. Butina was Russian, like the character in the movie. She was young, pretty, and a redhead. She was interested in the NRA and went to some Trump rallies. An entirely fabricated case was put together. Maria was arrested and psychologically brutalized before she pleaded guilty to conspiracy–a bargain to get out of indefinite solitary confinement in a maximum security prison. For three months she was held in solitary having done nothing at all! Still, the poor woman served another twelve months in prison on the trumped-up conspiracy charge before being flown back to Russia!
But the FBI and the military learn little. Despite Chelsea Manning and Edward Snowden, a young man, a twenty-one-year-old air national guardsman has been arrested for putting a trove of top secret documents on a server in a private chat group some six months ago! He wasn’t trying to sell or release the documents for political purposes. It was all about impressing his buddies on the chat group! Of course, the boast went on too long. Somebody in that private group released the documents more widely. The FBI didn’t catch wind of it until the whole world saw them!
Highly recommended reading! I expect America’s counterintelligence has successes (however that is measured), but the depth and extent of the failures are shocking. Enjoy!
Ruminations 