“God knows everything you’ve done and loves you. God knows everything you are going to do and still loves you” Vern Benom Grimsley
There is a present fashion among intellectuals, a belief they are not free willed in the libertarian sense, that libertarian free will is impossible in a universe of randomness (quantum mechanics) and determinism (everything else). Although this present fashion is rationalized by modern physics, the idea is as old as the Greeks. Democritus (of atom fame) was one of those who believed this, and so the debate has gone on for some 2400 years.
I make no secret of my scorn for this fashion (see “Arguing with Automatons” and “The Nonsensical Notion of Compatibilism”). It is the philosophical equivalent of adolescent obsession with self-mutilation. Philosophers, even atheist philosophers like John Searle (“MIND” 2005 and “Making the Social World” 2010), Nicholas Rescher (“Free Will: A Philosophical Reappraisal” 2009), and Edward Lowe (“Personal Agency” 2006), address the absurdity of this position, though Searle admits he cannot reconcile his epistemological conviction that free will must be genuine with his equally strong metaphysical conviction (grounded in physics) that it is impossible.
In this context, the term ‘libertarian’ is not a political ideology but refers to the idea that some agency, my “I”, is volitional; “at liberty” to cause (in Rescher’s term “initiate” [atemporal cause]) some sorts of neurological activity in my brain. Some entity (often called mind) is the starting point of actions instantiated in the physical world by my body. In effect a subjective agent, I, and not merely neurological activity (which I am not aware of directly) am in command/control of my body, and this I, while resting on neuro-physiology, has some independence from physics; there is a gap between that which chooses, and the physiology the choice precipitates. For this reason, the term “contra-causal will” is associated with libertarianism.
The idea here is that this “I” in command (mind?) does not appear to be a physical entity and so libertarian free will commits to the added idea there is in the universe a “cause of the physical” that is not physical. This idea violates a central principle of physics known as the Causal Closure Principle (see “Fantasy Physics and the Genisis of Mind”). The two ideas, libertarian will and contra-causal will, are therefore associated, but the connection rests on the assumption the “I” is not a physical object. ‘Libertarian’ refers to phenomenology, first person experience, while ‘contra-causal’ cause is a metaphysical idea. “Theological Fatalism” addresses the former and is not necessarily committed to the latter should the “I” happen to be physical (see “I Am a Strange Loop” 2004 by Douglas Hofstadter and Lowe referenced above).
On the other side of the debate, philosophers of religion (also going back to the Greeks) have an escape. God, being omnipotent, knows the trick of making contra-causal (and so libertarian) free will possible in a universe whose only other causes are random or deterministic.
Logicians then framed a puzzle. If God is omniscient, he knows everything that has, is, and will happen. This has to include every choice ever made (and ever to be made) by any minded being, personal or otherwise. If that is the case, if God already knows that when you step into a taquiria you will today order pollo and tomorrow carne asada, how can those choices be free? You cannot avoid the problem by intending to order chicken and then at the last moment changing your mind; God knows you will do that too. This puzzle is called “Theological Fatalism”. Even if God is the source of a third (contra-causal) cause, and “mind causes physics” (Sean Carroll “The Big Picture” 2016, something Carroll of course denies is possible) that cause cannot be free in the libertarian sense because God already knows what the choice will be and can never be wrong about it.
The puzzle is reminiscent of Zeno’s paradox (back to the Greeks again). Zeno said that movement, change in space, is impossible because to move a mile, or a foot, or even a millimeter, one has to go first half the distance, and then half that distance and so on blocking any movement before it begins. Although it seems obvious that we can move, it took some time for philosophers, early mathematicians, to figure out where Zeno goes wrong. The distance between any two points can be divided into an infinite series of smaller distances. Mathematicians demonstrated that one can traverse or complete an infinite series in a finite time. Zeno did not account for time and in a sense the same is true of Theological Fatalism, or at least that is a part of the story.
Before I dismantle this puzzle I want to note that this argument is raised by scientists and philosophers by way of ridicule; God himself is (or would be) inconsistent with free will. Oddly, many present-day theologians and philosophers of religion have accepted the argument and decided that therefore God is either not omniscient or not omnipotent!
If a theologian does not understand that God must be able to do and experience in ways we cannot and that there are logical riddles, transparent to God, we cannot (perhaps never will) fathom, who will? Such philosophers should hang up their philosophy hats and go away. Logically probing how such qualities as omnipotence and omniscience go together and yet provide for free will is one thing. Denying this is possible because they cannot figure out how it works is ridiculous; the pinnacle of hubris!
If God is God then he knows everything that has, is, and will happen throughout time with absolute assurance, never guessing, and never being surprised. His knowledge is immediate and atemporal, it is a knowledge of a sort we know nothing about by experience, nor can we grasp it logically. We can suppose that God’s knowledge must be infinite and perfect, but not what that is like to experience it.
I’ll go further for the sake of the conundrum. Harry Frankfurt is famous in ethics circles for coming up with a puzzle. A mad genius has learned to take over brains and can cause a person to make any decision the genius wishes. Moreover, the genius knows (here is the real genius) what decision you make as you are making it. If your decision is what the genius wants you to do anyway, she need do nothing. But if your decision is about to be what she doesn’t want, she can force you to make the one she wants and do so in such a way that you do not even realize you are being forced! The question is: is your will still free?
The short answer to the Frankfurt question is, I think, yes you are free when you make the decision the genius wants and no otherwise. My point in bringing this up is to note that God has the power (omnipotence plus omniscience) to be the supreme Frankfurt genius! While we appear to be free, we are merely compelled (having no feeling of being compelled) to follow God’s script. But this mistakenly implies a causal relation between what God knows and what we do. No one claims theological fatalism precludes freedom because it is causal . It is rather a logical problem. God does not cause, that is force, us to make a particular choice. The matter is rather about what God knows in what seems, from our viewpoint to be “ahead of time”. But God’s foreknowledge is foreknowledge only from a human, temporal, perspective. What ever be the limits of human libertarian freedom, even the most dyed-in-the-wool libertarian does not suppose that such limits include contravention of natural law, including time.
In the comments here an interlocutor points out that what God knows amounts to fate, and for this reason we are not free. It is a viewpoint that amounts to a deduction from a universal perspective impossible for us to actually have. Since “God is one” one might argue that everything that, to us, appears differentiated about the universe is all illusion or but a shadow of the singular unified reality. This ignores the manifest, to us, reality of matter and a richly differentiated universe. Both views reflect the same singular reality, some shadow to God, differentiated reality to us. It is from this perspective that we are free even if what we choose is, from God’s universal view fated.
No libertarian claims our freedom is absolute. Just as we cannot contravene natural law, so also we cannot surprise God. So long as (and assuming) mind is a cause in time, the future is genuinely open in time! If from our perspective, always limited to the present, a choice makes a future difference, then our choice is free from within that perspective.
Of course we might still be wrong about this if God is a deceiver, if it is in fact the case (as in Frankfurt’s clever puzzle) that we are not the cause of our choices, or that we are that cause only when we choose what God has foreordained. But if we are deceived then God has to be causing our choices and that is not the crux of theological fatalism.
There is every reason to believe that God (should he exist) cannot be a deceiver (see Prolegomena to a Future Theology). It does seem to experience that our will itself, the subjective mind exercising it, is (provided we are of normal brain) sovereign over choice no matter what choice we make. That God knows what that choice will be does not abrogate its freedom from within the view of our temporally constrained, to the present, perspective.
From our viewpoint, future possibilities from among which we choose (God knows these also) are in fact genuinely open to us because we do not know what God knows. We do, subjectively, choose from among alternatives and “which choice” we make makes a future difference to us and others whom the choice may entangle. This is all a robust libertarian free will needs. The strongest advocates of libertarian will do not demand that no power in the universe knows what you will decide. Being unable to “surprise God” does not equate to fate from our perspective.
Libertarianism requires only that we cannot know what that power knows and as concerns God’s viewpoint this is surely true. To say then: “well our freedom is purely perspectival, or stems merely from our limited perspective” is trivially true, but over-simplified. All freedom short of God stems from or exists within some perspective. It is freedom nevertheless because from within any perspective it bears causal responsibility for the particular choice made.
All that libertarianism requires is that subjective agency, the self-aware subject, and not deterministic neurophysiology nor God causally, initiates action from within its perspective and this requirement is fully satisfied in the human experience of willing. We are free in our experience and if “mind can cause physics”, if contra-causal cause is real (possible if God is real), and God is not a deceiver, then we are free in the libertarian sense, from within our perspective, despite what God knows. God knows what we will choose, but so long as his knowledge is not a cause of our choice our will is free within its constrained perspective. Theological fatalism is a false doctrine.
19 thoughts on “The Mistake in Theological Fatalism”
It is “pollo”, not “polo”. XD
It looks like you are replacing the puzzle of fatalism with another puzzle, that of a type of knowledge we don’t know anything about.
What type of knowledge am I claiming that we “don’t know anything about”?
Thanks for the polo –> pollo correction.
From your own text, on “the solution”: “His knowledge is immediate and atemporal, it is a knowledge of a sort we know nothing about by experience, nor can we grasp it logically.”
Oh ok.. But I’m not substituting *that* knowledge for anything. It is an assumption concerning God’s knowledge not ours. An entity who is not omniscient would be at best a demigod.
But you are proposing a type of knowledge that is not the usual concept of omniscience so as to prevent that omniscience from precluding free will and so as to avoid fatalism. This unfathomable type of knowledge is your solution to fatalism and is a bigger puzzle than fatalism itself (your solution is unsolvable by principle, as we can not know anything about it).
So we are speaking of God’s knowledge not human. Ok, but how is this different from your understanding of omniscience and why would one version be any more plausible than any other? My view can be traced back to Augustine I believe so not really alien. Thanks for comment..
Your version of god’s knowledge can not be understood by your own words. Therefore it is not a solution to any puzzle.
No we cannot comprehend the way God knows, but we can infer what must be necessary of it, Absolute omniscience in this case. He must know everything, across all time, no surprises.
So you are not solving the puzzle that you nevertheless called “childish”!
I did solve it. You aren’t reading or you are biased no matter what the argument: omniscience *outside* or across time is not a cause *in* time. Fatalism is a childish argument because even children eventually figure out that knowing something will happen is not a cause of it happening
Fatalism does not say that God’s knowledge causes our behaviour! But it certainly precludes (if it’s really knowledge and not guessing) any other course of action, hence fate. Your solution is to say that God’s knowledge is special in that it magically does not preclude other possible actions and does this in a way we can not understand.
No I am not saying that. I am saying that from our viewpoint within time our will is to all extent and purposes free as concerns the future viewed from within time. What we choose makes a difference IN TIME and that is all I need for HUMAN (or for that matter animal) free will.
But logic says that, if from outside time, what you do is already known, then it means that you WILL choose that action and there is no chance of you choosing something else. What you “choose” makes no difference IN TIME.
From your viewpoint you have the illusion of free will just because of your ignorance.
Your assigning a magical property to God’s omniscience is an attempt to overcome logic.
Your argument reminds me of ancient (and here over-simplified) Hindu metaphysics. If “spirit” is the source of everything then “matter” is not real other than being a shadow of the “higher reality”. What this gets wrong is that from OUR viewpoint, matter is perfectly real, in fact the “realist” thing there is (unless you are an idealist). Your argument follows this same logic. If God knows all, then free will is an illusion. Even if this is in a certain sense “technically correct” from God’s viewpoint (a viewpoint which we cannot assume for ourselves), from our viewpoint free will is real (like matter) because futures appear actually open, and which we choose actually does make a difference — again FROM OUR VIEWPOINT which is the only one we have.
So take your pick. If matter is an illusion because God(s) created it, then yes, by the same argument free will is an illusion because God knows what happens. But if matter is REAL because it is real from our viewpoint, then free will is also real from our viewpoint.
But this discussion has given me ideas with which to strengthen the article by pointing all of this out. Thanks!
Knowing that free will is only real from your viewpoint is equivalent to knowing that it is an illusion. You either discard an omniscient God to accept a fully real free will or you are faced with an only-from-this-perspective free will. In either case you have not debunked the fatalist conclusion.
Since “this perspective” is the only one we have it is all I need. Theological Fatalism is false precisely because we can’t know what God knows. The only issue remaining is the reality of contra-causal will and you need God to get that.